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Abstract—Observing, understanding, and mitigating the ef-
fects of failure in embedded systems is essential for building
dependable control systems. We develop a software-based moni-
toring methodology to further this goal. This methodology can be
applied to any embedded system peripheral and allows the system
to operate normally while the monitoring software is running. We
use software to instrument the operating system kernel and record
indicators of system behavior. By comparing those indicators
against baseline indicators of normal system operation, faults
can be detected and appropriate action can be taken.
We implement this methodology to detect faults caused by
electrostatic discharge in a USB host controller. As indicators, we
select specific control registers that provide a manifestation of the
internal execution of the host controller. Analysis of the recorded
register values reveals differences in system execution when the
system is subject to interference. This improved understanding
of system behavior may lead to better hardware and software
mitigation of electrostatic discharge and assist in root-cause
analysis and repair of failures.
Keywords—Software instrumentation, Electrostatic discharge,
Failure analysis, Universal Serial Bus, Computerized instrumen-
tation, Embedded software, Software debugging
I. INTRODUCTION
As embedded systems become smaller and smaller, they
become more vulnerable to physical events and thus more
difficult to make reliable. Interference from Electrostatic
Discharge (ESD) is a major cause of this unreliability, since
a smaller electrical charge is required for smaller components
to experience an ESD event. The effects of these events on
the software running on the embedded system are not yet
well understood. In order to understand these effects, we must
observe how the hardware effects of ESD manifest in the
software controlling that hardware.
Depending on severity, ESD events can cause permanent
hardware damage or manifest as software glitches, such as
screen flickers or program crashes, that appear random and
unexpected to the system user. Associating these user-observed
failures with specific software and hardware faults is an ongoing
challenge. Additionally, component miniaturization increases
the difficulty of monitoring all traces on a board for ESD with
hardware probes. Even if all the traces could be monitored, it
is a nontrivial task to analyze where the ESD coupled to the
system and the resulting effect it had on various components.
Finally, while invasive hardware testing might be feasible on a
development board, testing on consumer hardware not equipped
with test points and monitoring hardware is much more difficult.
Executing in-field tests or analyzing faults that only occur on
production hardware are daunting tasks.
We propose a low-level, lightweight software-based method
for monitoring, detecting, and analyzing the effects of ESD
events. Our method is applicable to other types of electromag-
netic interference, but in the interest of clarity, the focus of
this paper is on ESD events. Software instrumentation allows
for monitoring of hardware that cannot be physically probed.
Some existing software analysis techniques focus on high-
level failures, e.g., screen glitches, but stop short of root-cause
analysis of hardware faults. Other software approaches study
low-level failures, such as data corruption in CPU caches,
but require complete control of the system unmediated by an
operating system and are thus inapplicable to systems under
typical usage conditions. Our approach uses modified hardware
drivers to allow a system in the field to be monitored for ESD
events.
With software instrumentation, we are able to observe
changes in system operation caused by ESD. We compare
this to operation during normal system operation to determine
whether a system is experiencing an ESD event. These results
have several applications in failure analysis as well as hardware
and software design. Collected data can be used for postmortem
analysis, validating system designs, and runtime fault detection
and recovery. Throughout this paper, we will discuss these
observations and analyses within the context of a USB host
controller on an embedded system, specifically, an ARM system
running Linux. In our work, we consider small-scale ESD events
that do not persist after a power cycle.
In this paper, we present:
• A method for instrumenting device drivers to monitor
internal operation of system peripherals.
• A method for analyzing the observed states of peripheral
operation.
The rest of the paper is as follows: Section II reviews related
literature. Our software instrumentation approach is described
in Section III. Section IV discusses the data analysis algorithm.
Experimental setup is documented in Section V and results and
observations are presented in Section VI. Finally, Section VII
draws conclusions and discusses future extensions to this work.
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II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED LITERATURE
ESD-induced failures can be broadly categorized as either
hard failures or soft failures [1]. In this context, a hard failure
permanently damages the system so that components must be
replaced. Soft failures, on the other hand, can be recovered
from; these failures are further characterized into three levels
based on the visibility of the failure and the action needed to
recover from it:
Level 1) The system automatically recovers with no user-
visible faults or loss or corruption of data. Often
this recovery is possible due to ESD-robust
hardware and fault-tolerant control protocols.
Level 2) The system experiences a system-level manifesta-
tion, such as momentary screen or data corruption,
but recovers without intervention.
Level 3) The system crashes or requires the user to per-
form an action, such as resetting the system or
unplugging and re-plugging a device, to recover
from a fault condition.
These failures are studied using a variety of hardware- and
software-based techniques.
Numerous studies have investigated the relationship between
ESD interference and level 2 and 3 soft failures. Hardware ESD
fault injection with direct injection and field injection probes is
described in [2–4]. These studies characterize integrated circuit
(IC) immunity to ESD. The sensitivity threshold for each IC
was determined by injecting ESD at increasing voltages and
observing when errors occurred. In these studies, only user-
visible errors, such as screen glitches or hardware resets, were
investigated.
Izadi et al. [5] extend this fault injection process by mapping
the ESD sensitivity of the board.The injection probes are
attached to a 2-D scanner that sweeps them across the board.
At each point on a grid over the CPU, ESD is injected and the
level at which the device becomes susceptible is recorded. The
resulting map can be used to identify traces and components
that are at risk for ESD damage. Mapping is carried out at
various CPU loads and clock speeds; the authors determine
that the system is most susceptible under heavy load and low
clock speed.
Vora et al. [6] study user-visible soft failures in a mi-
croprocessor, a microcontroller, and an FPGA. In particular,
they observed a relationship between CPU load and likelihood
of display flicker on a microprocessor, indicating that ESD
was coupling to the CPU chip rather than to the display
itself. Furthermore, they observed that the likelihood of certain
failures—process termination and display flicker—depend on
the program executing at the time of the ESD event.
Investigating level 1 soft failures and understanding the
root causes of higher-level soft failures requires the ability to
observe a system’s behavior at a high level of detail. Vora et al.
[6, 7], Feng et al. [8] use a custom microcontroller running
code which monitors register values and system interrupts to
study the effects of ESD on CPUs. While too invasive to use
on a system performing additional tasks, this approach gives a
very fine-grain view of observable soft failures. In particular,
the authors observe numerous multiple bit errors in IO registers
and frequent spurious interrupt triggers.
The effect of ESD on USB devices in particular has
also been investigated. Maghlakelidze et al. [9] develop an
automated testing system for studying soft failures in a
USB interface on a single-board computer. The system is
characterized by injecting ESD pulses of varied voltage and
pulse width into specific IC pins. Soft failures are observed
based on data transmission rate and error messages in kernel
logs. Under positive voltage injections, most failures did not
require user interaction; however, negative voltage injections
produced numerous severe soft failures. Koch et al. [10] further
test USB-related soft failures and determine that likelihood of
failure is also dependent on the state of the USB protocol, i.e.,
which packets are being transmitted at the time of the injection.
Root cause analysis shows that many failures are caused by
ESD coupling to the power domains in the USB controller
rather than to data lines.
While some soft failures are not user-visible, they may still
be observable by software monitoring of low-level system
behavior. Yuan et al. [11] continuously poll the status of
a phase-lock loop (PLL) embedded in the microcontroller;
if the PLL unlocks, it can be assumed that the system has
experienced an ESD shock. While this approach provides an
excellent measure of ESD events on the microcontroller, it
cannot measure peripheral ESD events because most peripherals
do not contain a separate PLL that can be monitored by the
microcontroller.
Another case study of low-level system monitoring is carried
out in [12] on a wireless router. A debugging serial port on the
router logs every context switch performed by the processors,
giving an approximate record of the execution path taken by
processes running on the router. This data is collected into
system function graphs of both reference operating function
and ESD-exposed function. Several graph metrics are applied
to these graphs; differences in metric values indicate that soft-
failures can be observed by this monitoring technique.
While not directly related to ESD events, software-based
as well as combined hardware and software system moni-
toring approaches have been studied extensively. Watterson
and Heffernan [13] outline research related to monitoring
for runtime verification. System state is monitored by some
combination of hardware and software; this information is
then used to verify that the system is operating within
specification. A software-specific study of fault monitoring
is carried out by [14]. The authors present a taxonomy of
runtime monitoring approaches and discuss various system
requirements for different monitoring techniques.
Choudhuri and Givargis [15] develop a mixed hardware
and software approach for logging non-deterministic behavior
in embedded systems. They modify a compiler to emit code
that logs messages to an attached storage system, reducing
processing overhead on the low-powered embedded hardware
being monitored. Reinbacher et al. [16] create a tool that
converts an embedded system software specification into both
an executable and a configuration for a hardware monitor. The
hardware monitor interfaces with the embedded CPU and its
communication buses and verifies the operation of the system.
Delgado et al. [14] develop a software-based monitoring
system for ATMs by instrumenting the drivers for each hardware
component to measure state and performance. A runtime
978-1-7281-7551-5/20/$31.00 c©2020 IEEE
2020 CSI/CPSSI International Symposium on Real-Time and Embedded Systems and Technologies (RTEST)
Fig. 1. USB subsystem block diagram
checker uses the resulting data to determine if the system
is operating correctly. If not, recovery actions can be taken to
restore system availability.
The goal of our work is to improve the resolution of ESD
software detection—in effect, to make some level 1 soft failures
visible to detection software—and to better understand the
software and hardware root causes of all types of soft failures.
Early detection of ESD effects and detailed logs of system
behavior are essential to tracing ESD as it propagates through a
system. We aim to achieve this with minimal impact to system
behavior, as the visibility and behavior of ESD-induced failures
can change based on the processes running on the system.
Allowing a system to operate as it does in the field provides a
better basis for testing ESD effects and reproducing unusual
ESD-induced failures. Finally, such instrumentation enables
real-time monitoring and recovery from faults, improving
system immunity to level 2 and 3 soft failures.
III. PROPOSED MONITORING APPROACH
Inducing ESD events on an embedded system peripheral
causes bits to flip in its data or control lines and power glitches
that corrupt computations. These flipped bits can lead to changes
in register values, loss of synchronization between peripherals
and the CPU, or data corruption. All of these effects are visible
to software running on the embedded system and thus should
be detectable by monitoring software. Our objective is to use
software to log as many of these events as possible for analysis.
Monitoring only for corruption of transmitted data may be
confounded by protocol-level checksums and retransmissions;
furthermore, doing so only observes the effects of ESD on
data lines and misses ESD events caused by discharges into
the chip power supplies. The methodology we propose offers a
lower-level view of peripheral operation that captures a wider
array of ESD events.
This work can be applied to many computer peripherals,
but we present it in the context of a USB Host Controller on an
embedded system running Linux (see Section V for more detail).
The Host Controller serves as an interface between the physical
USB hardware and the software executing on the system’s CPU
as shown in Figure 1. Its responsibilities include enumerating
devices as they are connected and disconnected, configuring
power delivery, and communicating data and control signals
between the system’s memory and the USB peripherals. We
select it for instrumentation as it connects directly to the USB
bus and is thus subject to any ESD events happening on the
bus.
Our work focuses on non-invasive monitoring of the effects
of ESD events using software that allows normal system
operation. We primarily study changes in register values, as
those values control the operation of the peripheral device.
Each system state is represented by the n-tuple consisting
Fig. 2. Research Methodology
of the values of each peripheral register at a specific time.
Some of these changes will be part of normal operation. When
ESD is induced, however, we should observe new abnormal
states or unexpected transitions between normal states. These
abnormal states and transitions can indicate that the system is
experiencing ESD. Our analysis avoids state-space explosion
by only considering states that are observed during system
operation; it does not exhaustively explore the state space.
The USB host controller is a complex piece of hardware
whose operation is quite opaque to the system CPU. We cannot
inspect any of its internal registers or microcode execution
process. The extent of our visibility into its operation is the
control registers it exposes to the system. We select registers
to monitor that provide a manifestation of the host controller’s
internal state. Recording snapshots of register values as the
system performs USB operations gives a trace of host controller
execution. The goal of this research is to use these traces to
observe anomalous operation potentially caused by ESD, as
summarized in Figure 2.
While the host controller’s registers are mapped in system
memory, Linux’s memory protection mechanisms prevent
unprivileged programs from reading them. Thus, we must insert
some software into the Linux kernel to allow us access to those
memory addresses. Initially we attempted a naive approach
which repeatedly sampled the registers in a loop. After this
approach proved ineffective, we developed a more sophisticated
approach which captures register values every time they are
relevant to software executing on the CPU.
A. Initial Design
Our first design focused on directly reading USB register
values from their physical memory addresses. We adapted the
Myregrw [17] software to better suit our needs as a softprobe
for ESD. This software consists of a Linux system driver and
a program that communicates with it. The driver reads the
values of requested physical memory addresses. The user-level
program reads a configuration file specifying which addresses
to request, repeatedly requests the data at those addresses, and
stores that data to a file.
We configured Myregrw to record the control and status
registers for the USB host interface.1 We injected ESD into
the host controller while Myregrw continuously sampled the
registers. In theory, ESD-caused changes should appear in the
recorded register values.
However, the sampling rate of this softprobe was not
sufficient to observe ESD-induced errors. We empirically
determined that the sampling rate of the software running
1These are mapped in the physical address range 0x49000000–
0x49000014.
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on the system used in our experiments is, on average, 342Hz.
We can assume in the worst case that the system executes
one instruction per cycle and would reset a register value
after one instruction. The system we ran these experiments
on has a 400MHz clock (see Section V for details). We can
calculate a pessimistic lower bound on the sampling rate by
assuming the worst case scenario of a register value changing
every clock cycle. In this situation, we would log on average
342
400∗106 ∗ 100 = 0.000856% of its values. As we have twenty-
three registers to monitor, the effective sampling rate will be
even lower. Considering this low probability and the lack of
information recorded from our experiments, we devised a new
measurement methodology with a higher sampling rate capable
of recording additional register values.
A confounding issue with this approach is the competition
for access to these values between the Myregrw driver and
the USB host controller driver. By default, Linux drivers have
execution priority over any user applications, meaning that it
would be nearly impossible to read all of the register values
after an error but before the USB host controller driver modifies
the registers. Therefore, we developed a new methodology that,
in addition to providing a faster sampling rate, ensures the
register values are recorded before the USB host controller
driver can modify them.
B. Improved Design
In the improved approach, we first enabled the debugging
configuration already present in the USB host controller driver.
We then modified the drivers for the USB host controller. The
host controller driver consists of several functions that are called
when certain events occur; for example, ohci_irq is called
when an IRQ occurs for the host controller. We configured
each function to first log its name and the values of the host
controller registers to the system log. These modifications allow
us to observe not only register state changes but also the order
in which different driver functions are called. An example of
such a log entry is shown in Figure 3.
This approach is minimally invasive as the driver modi-
fications are minor and do not affect the logic of the driver
itself. While this induces a constant overhead, in practice the
overhead is small2 and can be reduced by using, e.g., a buffer
to hold log entries and a separate program to write those entries
to a file. The sampling rate is variable, but it exactly captures
the driver-visible operation of the USB host controller.
IV. PROPOSED ANALYSIS APPROACH
The log files generated by the instrumented driver consist
of lines each having a timestamp, register name, and associated
register value. We parse these lines into n-tuples containing
snapshots of register values at the time of each function call.
The sequence of n-tuples from each log constitutes an execution
trace.
Many of these execution traces revisit the same states
repeatedly. By identifying these repeated states and coalescing
them, we can develop an execution graph. This graph is a
directed graph where each node is a unique system state and
an edge from node s to node t indicates that the system went
2Estimated less than 10% overhead.
function: ohci_irq
HcControl: 0x83
HcCommandStatus: 0x4
HcInterruptStatus: 0x24
HcInterruptEnable: 0x8000005e
HcInterruptDisable: 0x8000005e
HcHCCA: 0x338b1000
HcPeriodCurrentED: 0x0
HcControlHeadED: 0x339b2000
HcControlCurrentED: 0x0
HcBulkHeadED: 0x339b2080
HcBulkCurrentED: 0x0
HcDoneHead: 0x0
HcFmInterval: 0xa7782edf
HcFmRemaining: 0x80002760
HcFmNumber: 0x921d
HcPeriodicStart: 0x2a2f
HcLSThreshold: 0x628
HcRhDescriptorA: 0x2001202
HcRhDescriptorB: 0x0
HcRhStatus: 0x8000
HcRhDescriptorA: 0x2001202
HcRhPortStatus[0]: 0x103
HcRhPortStatus[1]: 0x100
Done.
Fig. 3. Example host controller state
from state s to state t in the corresponding execution trace.
An execution trace then becomes a path through the execution
graph.
Once execution graphs for each log have been created, we
repeat the deduplication process to produce the unified execu-
tion graph of all runs. This allows us to identify similarities
and differences among system execution traces.
The operation of the analysis code can be summarized as
follows:
1) Parse the log files to create states based on the registers’
values.
2) Deduplicate these execution traces to derive a per-run
execution graph.
3) Deduplicate the execution graphs of different runs to derive
a universal execution graph.
4) Using this execution graph and each run’s execution trace,
perform statistical analysis on the data.
A. Constructing Execution Graphs
The first stage of analysis parses register values from the
log file for each run. After creating tuples for each of the states
in that file, we deduplicate the sequence of states to create the
nodes of the execution graph. We then derive the execution
trace path through the execution graph from the state sequence.
We also record the number of times each transition is taken.
B. Constructing the Unified Execution Graph
The next analysis step combines the data from each log into
a unified execution graph. The process is similar to that used
to develop the execution graph for each log. Certain registers
for the host controller contain memory addresses that change
every time the driver is reloaded.3 The values of these registers
3These registers are HcPeriodCurrentED, HcBulkCurrentED,
HcFmRemaining, HcHCCA, HcControlHeadED,
HcControlCurrentED, HcBulkHeadED, HcFmNumber, and
HcDoneHead.
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are not significant to our analysis; however, changes in the
values are as they indicate changes in host controller execution.
Therefore, we create a new globally unique state each time the
value changes within a trace.
C. Graph Analysis
We divide the data collected from test runs into two groups:
baseline and ESD-exposed. Baseline logs are logs of the system
operating normally; they provide us with the system’s expected
state machine. ESD-exposed logs document how the system
transitions into and out of unexpected behavior due to ESD
exposure.
After we create the graph of globally unique states, we
analyze the baseline and ESD-exposed logs individually to
observe how system operation differs among them. We subtract
the set of states reached in baseline logs from the set of states
reached in ESD-exposed logs to get a list of states only reached
during ESD injection. These state sets can be used to show
where and when the system transitioned into a state that can
potentially be attributed to ESD. Similarly, we can determine
which transitions between states are present only during ESD
exposure.
V. CASE STUDY
The system used for tests was the FriendlyArm Mini2440
embedded development platform with a Samsung S3C2440
ARM926T processor [18]. Its USB host interface conforms
to the Open Host Controller Interface specifications [19]. The
system ran a modified Linux kernel based on the version 2.6.29
kernel downloaded from the FriendlyArm website [18].4 We
set up the system with our logging software and connected it
to a PC to control it during the tests. During testing, a standard
USB 2.0 flash drive was connected to the system’s USB port.
To ensure that the host controller is active during ESD injection,
we copied a large file to or from the flash drive during tests.
To thoroughly characterize system behavior, ESD interfer-
ence was injected using electric (E) field and magnetic (H) field
probes powered by a transmission line pulse (TLP) generator.
For each probe, multiple tests were run with varying pulse
voltages. In addition, different sizes of probes were used to
adjust the intensity of the fields injected. The E-field probe
does not have an orientation; we positioned it across the USB
port or over the host controller IC. E-field interference was
injected using an EZ-3 probe at voltages between 500 and
5500 volts with a pulse width between 0.1 and 0.25 seconds.
Because the magnetic fields generated by the H-field probe are
directional, we conducted tests with the probe in parallel with
and perpendicular to the data and control lines. We used two
probes, the HX-5 and the HX-1T2, injecting ESD betweeen
500 and 8000 volts with pulse widths between 0.1 and 0.6
seconds. The system was more resilient to H-field interference,
allowing us to perform H-field tests with more intense ESD
conditions than were possible with E-field tests.
4We have successfully replicated this study on a more recent Linux kernel
version; the results are forthcoming.
TABLE I. PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION OF REGISTER VALUES:
HCINTERRUPTENABLE AND HCINTERRUPTDISABLE
Value Baseline ESD-exposed ProbabilityProbability Enable Disable Difference
0x8000005e 0.22289 0.20041 0.20041 0
0x8000001a 0.01350 0.09677 0.09666 0.00011
0x8000005a 0.76156 0.65932 0.65943 -0.00011
0x8000001e 0.00202 0.04359 0.04359 0
0x04
0x06
0x44*
0x46*
0x20†
0x24†
0x26†
0x60†*
0x64†*
0x66†*
1E-5 1E-4 1E-3 1E-2 1E-1 1E+0
Value Probability
00.010.020.030.040.05
Change in Probability
Baseline
ESD-exposedValues
Fig. 4. Probability Distribution of Register Values: HcInterruptStatus
† indicates frame counter overflow; * indicates status change
VI. RESULTS
A. Registers of Interest
Certain registers on the host controller were observed
to give indications of ESD. In particular, we consider the
values of the registers for interrupt enabling and disabling
(HcInterruptEnable and HcInterruptDisable),
interrupt status (HcInterruptStatus), control
(HcControl), and port status (HcRhPortStatus0).
The host controller has multiple events and errors it can
generate hardware interrupts for; the driver can enable and
disable them depending on the current operation and check
whether they have been triggered via the interrupt enable,
disable, and status registers. The control register allows the
driver to switch between various USB transfer modes and
enable certain host controller features. The port status register
reports whether a port is enabled, what device is connected to
a port, device power configuration, etc.
Per the OHCI specification [19], HcInterruptEnable
and HcInterruptDisable should be duplicates of each
other when read. However, as shown in Table I, there are a few
states in the ESD-exposed data where they are not duplicates.
This may indicate ESD-induced bit flips or the system failing
to properly update both registers when one is changed.
The HcInterruptStatus register values observed are
shown in Figure 4 along with the probability of those values
appearing in baseline and ESD-exposed logs and the absolute
change in that probability due to ESD exposure. It shows a
dramatic increase in values where the frame number counter
overflowed (marked †) in the ESD-exposed logs, indicating that
the system transmits many more frames during ESD exposure.
In addition, values indicating the hub’s status has changed
(marked *) are also much more prevalent in ESD-exposed logs.
The HcControl register values provide a different per-
spective on the increase in the number of frames and hub status
changes. Figure 5 shows a great increase in control frame
processing (0x93) and a corresponding decrease in bulk data
978-1-7281-7551-5/20/$31.00 c©2020 IEEE
2020 CSI/CPSSI International Symposium on Real-Time and Embedded Systems and Technologies (RTEST)
0x83
0x93
0xa3
1E-3 1E-2 1E-1 1E+0
Value Probability
00.020.040.060.080.10.120.14
Change in Probability
Baseline
ESD-exposedValues
Fig. 5. Probability Distribution of Register Values: HcControl
0x000100⋄
0x000101⋄
0x000103⋄
0x000111*
0x000113*
0x010100
0x010101
0x020101
0x030100
0x030101
0x100103
0x020103†
0x020111†*
0x020113†*
0x120101†
00.020.040.060.080.1
Change in Probability
1E-5 1E-4 1E-3 1E-2 1E-1 1E+0
Value Probability BaselineESD-exposedValues
Fig. 6. Probability Distribution of Register Values: HcRhPortStatus0
 indicates device connected with no change in port status; † indicates port
enabled/disabled; * indicates port reset
frame processing (0xa3). It is possible that ESD glitches are
disrupting bus operation, requiring the host controller and device
to send a greater number of status change frames. In addition,
corruption in the bulk data frames would require retransmissions
and therefore increase the number of new control and data
frames (0x83).
The HcRhPortStatus0 register contains status informa-
tion about the port the USB drive was plugged into during
testing. Figure 6 shows a marked decrease in states where the
port status remains unchanged () and an increase in states
indicating the port has been enabled or disabled (†). As well,
port resets (*) were only observed in ESD-exposed logs. The
prevalence of resets and toggling whether the port is enabled
hint that the host controller is experiencing unexpected errors
and attempting to recover by resetting the port’s status. The
presence of a port reset where the driver or host controller
would not usually issue one is a particularly strong indicator
of ESD exposure.
B. Execution Graphs
Figure 7 shows an execution graph of sample baseline and
ESD-exposed execution traces. The set of nodes and solid
arcs on the left of the figure is the execution graph of the
baseline log. The right of the figure consists of the additional
states and transitions present in the sample ESD-exposed log.
This execution graph demonstrates several potential effects of
ESD on the system state: 1 transitions to non-baseline states,
2 transitions between non-baseline states, 3 non-baseline
transitions between baseline states, and 4 transitions from
non-baseline to baseline states.
Consider how we should expect the system to behave under
normal conditions and under ESD exposure. Normally, it should
have a small number of common code paths and some edge
b0 baseline start
b1
b2
b3
b4
b5
b6
b7
b8
b9
b10b11
b26 ESD-exposed start
e0
b20
b21
b12
b19
b24
b25
b18
b23
e1
e2
e3
e4
e5
e6
b35
b36
e7
e8
e9
e10
e11
b37
1
2
3
4
bn bn: nth state present in baseline logs
bn en: nth state present only in ESD-exposed logs
transition present in baseline logs
transition present only in ESD-exposed logs
Fig. 7. Execution graph of one baseline trace and one ESD-exposed execution
trace
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Fig. 8. Average State Occurrences Per Log
case handling. Under ESD exposure, we should see a number of
anomalous states caused by various register bits being flipped
as well as control flow anomalies. Figure 8 shows the average
number of occurrences of states per baseline and ESD-exposed
traces. The baseline traces show a few states that are very
common and a small tail of less common states. There are far
more unique states in ESD-exposed logs, and they are far less
likely to occur. (We have omitted half of the ESD-exposed state
tail to make the interesting portion of the graph more legible.)
This graph provides quick verification of our methodology; we
can see that the data we have collected reflects expected system
behavior.
Figure 9 compares the TLP pulse voltage with the per-
centage of transitions to or from states not in the baseline
logs. The lack of a clear relationship between observed ESD
coupling and pulse voltage indicates that there are confounding
factors between ESD exposure and system behavior. These
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Fig. 9. Relationship between pulse voltage and ESD-caused transitions
factors may include field type and orientation, injection location,
pulse frequency, and the operation being performed by the host
controller at the time of injection. In addition, the ESD injection
may cause the system to crash almost instantaneously, in which
case the resulting state log will have relatively few states caused
by ESD. More work is needed to assess the effect each of these
factors has on system operation.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have presented a software-based methodology for
detecting ESD events on embedded system peripherals. This
methodology monitors the state of the peripheral by reading
the registers it exposes to the CPU with an instrumented kernel
driver for the peripheral. As with all software monitoring
techniques, this approach is only able to monitor events
that do not entirely disrupt CPU execution. We applied this
methodology to a USB host controller on an embedded system
running Linux. We demonstrated that we are able to observe
states and transitions that the system experiences only when
exposed to ESD.
Furthermore, the relationship between the recorded errors
and ESD can be reversed. Doing so allows us to predict, based
on the errors that the software experiences, when and where
the system experiences ESD. We can apply this in several
ways: components that have received ESD can be identified,
either for replacement (if the goal of the experiment is to repair
hardware that has experienced ESD) or for improvement (if
the goal is to reduce the effects of ESD on a peripheral); in
addition, software can be written to recover from error states in
a more efficient and automatic fashion. Software may also be
able to compensate for the effects of ESD, allowing operation
to continue in hostile environments at the cost of reduced
performance and more software overhead.
A topic for future research is correlating system states with
ESD injection on a specific location on the board, which could
give insight into which components have experienced ESD for
performing repairs or assist circuit designers in shielding the
board from particular error states. One could also study system
states from a software perspective to determine how best to
recover from certain ESD-induced errors. Finally, applying this
methodology to other peripherals and embedded systems may
lead to additional insights for software monitoring. In particular,
applying this methodology in tandem with PCB schematic and
chip layout analysis would provide a bridge between software-
observed and hardware-observed ESD effects.
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